Lessons from Russia's parliamentary early twentieth century

Lessons from Russia's parliamentary early twentieth century

5

Lessons from Russia's parliamentary

early twentieth century

Study of Russia's historical and political experience beginning of XX century. Promotes better understanding of the social realities of the Belarusian society, allows a clearer idea of the difficulties and possibilities of our movement toward democracy and the rule of law.

In Russia the beginning of the century there were signs of the crisis of the political regime, in which the characteristics of profiling is a monopoly position of the charismatic leader - the "autocrat". Any volume of the Complete Collection of Laws Russia Empire "convinces us that a decision on even the small, private issue needs to sanction the king. He personified the hypertrophied role of the state as property relations and the mechanism of their implementation, and in all other spheres of national life. To maintain this role, the ruling elite has sought to "streamline" the political system, although the complexity of the structure of society and its problems reclaim.

On the growth of opposition sentiment in society at large-scale social conflicts authority responsible only palliative measures in the sphere of political system. The stormy events of autumn 1905 forced Nicholas II to sign the Manifesto of October 17 "On improvement of public order", which announces the introduction in Russia "unshakable foundations of civil liberty. The State Duma was declared a "legislative agency" to take part in which he promised to bring "to the extent possible" those segments of the population who were excluded from the elections in "Bulygin" Duma [1, c. 199].

Consistent implementation of the principles proclaimed on October 17 could lead to the design of the constitutional order. However, in late 1905 - early 1906 enacts a number of limiting civil liberties "temporary rules". In April 1906, the text appears in the new edition of "Basic state laws. Because of this "Code of Nicholas II" disappears definition of power of the monarch as unlimited, but remains its symbol - obviously ambiguous - as "autocratic". The most radical 86-I article "Code" reads: "No new law can not follow without the approval of the State Council and State Duma and absorb force without the approval of the emperor", ie for the monarch has the final say, and not determined by the necessary procedures advance the bill in case of disagreement with the Emperor. Next 87 article provided an opportunity in the event of termination or interruption of the Duma and State Council to conduct debates in the Council of Ministers, with subsequent confirmation by the king in the form of "His Majesty's orders, take effect immediately. And the king retained the right to interrupt the meeting of the Duma and the State Council. Emperor could not enforce the laws in the form of individually approved by the "acts of top management" [2, c.139]. In the exclusive jurisdiction of the autocrat were the foreign policy, finances, army and navy, the appointment to senior posts in the government bureaucracy. All other public institutions were of secondary nature. Nominally, reminiscent of some West European counterparts, Russia's parliament (State Duma - the lower "chamber plus the State Council - " upper "chamber) really is not. Not institutionally integrated, functionally, these "house" opposed to each other.

The State Council has remained the focus of the higher bureaucracy. The election of half of its members (the other is still imposed king) did not essentially changed - The State Council provided its full control, and without the approval of the recommendation of the State Council of the Duma are automatically blocked. In some cases, the State Council are right of the emperor. The legislative powers of the Duma were limited to a special law that regulated its activity ("Establishment of the State Duma"): "The State Duma may initiate proceedings to repeal or modify existing and of new laws, except for essential public laws." As already noted, outside the jurisdiction of the Duma was originally submitted by foreign and military affairs. In fact, the Duma is not controlled and the state budget. If he did not claim it, the government received the money in the amount of last year's estimates. Formation of the cabinet, the choice of his head, just as the course of the Government, determined by the emperor. The government was responsible to him, but not before the legislature. Real leverage over the Duma did not have in this area. Over the period of the I and II, king of the Duma approved the 612 legislative acts, of which only 3 were discussed and approved by the State Duma and the Council of State [3, c.266].

The representative character of the Duma was offset by the electoral system. Elections I and II, the Duma passed on estates and property curiae. For each of them identified their standards of representation. In multi-stage elections did not take part, women, military, students, many minorities. Dispersed the first I, then II, and the Duma, the autocracy has committed 3 June 1907 constitutional coup, while changing the electoral law - without consideration of its Duma. The new law tightened the requirements of the property qualification, cut the peasant and working-class representation, increased the prerogatives of landlords, sharply reduced the quota for the national regions. This provided the reaction of III and IV of the Duma, practically illegitimate in the eyes of much of the population.

Thus, the formal legislative and independent Duma and State Council has actually performed the role of "zakonosoveschatelnyh" institutions, and reflect their opinions only propertied of the population of the empire. For all positions, they were dependent on the monarch and the executive branch. At relatively short period (1905 - 1907 gg) Block of public institutions of the empire had lost signs of systemic. It actually restored the June Third coup, but not on the new (liberal democratic) basis, and the old - the authoritarian.

Crisis facing the regime, did not become an incentive to develop thoughtful course of reform and consolidation around the ruling camp. The position of the monarch, dovlevshego all their authority, has not been consistent. Support Nicholas II's reform efforts Witte and Stolypin wore a conditional, limited, autocrat obviously did not realize the need of their proposed reforms. The ruling elite, forced by circumstances to allow the opposition to participate in political life continued to arrogantly ignore it, provoking the process of radicalization of society. Activity even liberals have become more pronounced anti-systemic nature. Already in February 1911 Octobrist Maklakov stated: "The idea of the center, the idea of sharing the renewal of Russia by the Government and the Duma was killed..." [4, c.57]. Bulgakov painfully wrote: "In essence, the agony of autocracy continued reign of Nicholas II, which was all solid, continuous suicide autocracy... through all the innumerable zigzags its policies and the latest insanity of war " [5, c.296].

Manifesto of October 17 and the electoral law were the result of not consciously chosen strategy, as a consequence of extraordinary circumstances. Instead of accepting the new conditions of the political game, the ruling elite has consistently sought to restore the status quo, their monopoly on decision-making. The result was the intensification of contradictions, the growth of confrontation, loss of power of legitimacy in the eyes of society, in the end - the forcible removal from the political arena - the collapse in 1917

In the mass of the ruling elite has not grown to awareness of the need of large-scale reforms in all major areas of society. Vlastpriderzhaschie did not understand the need for a holistic policy that implements the reform programs on the basis of civil concord, assignments of the new socio-political forces.

"Huge, transformed into a self-sufficient force, the Russian state was afraid of initiative and activity of the Russian people, it will cease to be human burden of responsibility for the fate of Russia... The state must become an internal force of the people, his own positive power of his instrument, rather than outside of them beginning, not the master of his " [6, c.66].

Thus, the formal legislative and independent Duma and State Council has actually performed the role of "zakonosoveschatelnyh" institutions, and reflect their opinions only propertied of the population of the empire. For all positions, they were dependent on the monarch and the executive branch. At relatively short period (1905 - 1907 gg) Block of public institutions of the empire had lost signs of systemic. It actually restored the June Third coup, but not on the new (liberal democratic) basis, and the old - the authoritarian.

Crisis facing the regime, did not become an incentive to develop thoughtful course of reform and consolidation around the ruling camp. The position of the monarch, dovlevshego all their authority, has not been consistent. Support Nicholas II's reform efforts Witte and Stolypin wore a conditional, limited, autocrat obviously did not realize the need of their proposed reforms. The ruling elite, forced by circumstances to allow the opposition to participate in political life continued to arrogantly ignore it, provoking the process of radicalization of society. Activity even liberals have become more pronounced anti-systemic nature. Already in February 1911 Octobrist Maklakov stated: "The idea of the center, the idea of sharing the renewal of Russia by the Government and the Duma was killed..." [4, c.57]. Bulgakov painfully wrote: "In essence, the agony of autocracy continued reign of Nicholas II, which was all solid, continuous suicide autocracy... through all the innumerable zigzags its policies and the latest insanity of war " [5, c.296].

Literature

1. The historical experience of the three Russian revolutions. V 3 kn. Kn.1. Dress rehearsal of the Great October Revolution: first bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia / by Society. Ed. PA Golub. - M., 1985.

2. Sorokin, AK from authoritarianism to democracy / AK Sorokin / Polis. - 1993. - № 1.

3. Eroshkin, N. History of public institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia / NP Eroshkin. - M., 1983.

4. Shelohaev, V. Ideology and political organization of Russia's liberal bourgeoisie 1907 - 1914 gg. / VV Shelohaev. - M., 1991.

5. Bulgakov, SN Christian Socialism / SN Bulgakov. - Novosibirsk, 1991.

6. Berdyaev, N. The fate of Russia / Berdyaev. - M., 1990.